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Abstract  
This paper describes an approach to sleep onset (SO) and insomnia that involves a 
broad, design-based theory of cognition and affect (H-CogAff, Sloman, 2003). It pro-
poses that the SO Control System (SOCS) has somnolent and insomnolent mentation 
inputs. A disruption of situational awareness and temporal sense making is posited to 
be somnolent. Perturbance (tertiary emotion) and primary emotions are posited as in-
somnolent. Many prior deliberate mentation strategies, prescribed as cognitive therapy 
for insomnia (CT-I), appear to be insufficiently counter-insomnolent (e.g., insuffi-
ciently able to compete with insistent motivators) and not inherently somnolent. Ac-
cording to tenets presented here, serial diverse imagining, a deliberate form of menta-
tion involving a cognitive shuffle, is predicted to be super-somnolent (somnolent and 
counter-insomnolent).  This paper calls for the development of SOCS theories and CT-
I, both from the design stance. Particular attention should be given to perturbance and 
the possibility of super-somnolent mentation. 
Introduction  
Insomnia and sleep onset (SO) present fascinating theoretical, empirical and practi-
cal challenges for researchers who adopt the design stance to understanding the mind  
(Sloman, 1993, 2010; McCarthy, 2008). Imagine an embodied human brain lying in 
bed, next to a slumbering partner, unable to produce a sufficiently somnolent mental 
incantation. Why and how is even successful SO only indirectly caused by executive 
functions? This limitation of conscious self-control is reminiscent of memory. For we 
cannot directly will ourselves to remember a fact for easy future recall. Memory uses 
indirect cues to determine the indexing priority, and hence probability of recall, of in-
formation (Anderson, 1990; Beaudoin, 2014, Ch. 7). Take the case of Alexander Lu-
ria’s patient, Zasetsky, whose executive brain areas were intact, but who lost most of 
his left occipital and parietal cortices: he could not recall newly learnt information at 
will (Donald, 2001, pp. 70-83). And yet the design of memory can be exploited 
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through deliberate recall practice, productive practice and other indirect subterfuges 
such as the ones devised by Zasetsky (Beaudoin, 2014). How can the design of the 
human mind be exploited to promote SO, to trick the brain into triggering sleep?  
Current psychological treatments for insomnia are widely regarded as being effec-
tive without having the side effects of medication (Morin & Benca, 2012; Neylan, 
2011). However, there is still room to develop better pre-sleep cognitive strategies 
(Harvey & Tang, 2003; Schmidt, Harvey, & Van der Linden, 2011). Can a different 
approach to insomnia, broad cognitive science, fill this gap? 
In this paper, I present and extend the super-somnolent mentation theory of SO 
from which are derived new deliberate mentation strategies to facilitate SO (Beaudoin, 
2013). This paper illustrates how from information processing theory, psychotherapy 
and self-help applications can be derived and targeted at a problem that affects a very 
large number of people (insomnia). The theory in question is broad in that it involves 
cognitive, affective and executive mechanisms across a proposed mental architecture 
(Beaudoin, 2014). The super-somnolent framework helps one to classify prior (classi-
cal) “thought management” techniques for insomnia, explain limits in their effective-
ness, develop new SO techniques, and relate these techniques to concerns outside the 
realm of sleep (e.g., play and sense making).  
A Design-based Approach to Sleep Onset 
The brain contains a sleep state switching system (SSSS) that controls SO and sleep 
exit (Brown et al., 2012, Saper et al, 2010). Current specifications of the SSSS’s Sleep 
Onset Control Subsystem (SOCS) focus on biological processes such as body temper-
atures, hormone levels and posture. These specifications reduce mental processes to 
“allostatic” status (Saper et al, 2010; McEwen, 2000). While mental processes are 
widely assumed to affect SO, information-processing models of the SOCS are lacking.    
The design-based approach of cognitive science suggests new ways of framing and 
addressing theoretical SO problems. Design requirements for the SOCS must be speci-
fied. The SOCS needs to know when it is acceptable and appropriate to initiate SO, 
otherwise narcoleptic events may ensue. In humans, it must consider mental infor-
mation. Executive processes influence SO; however, they cannot directly trigger SO 
nor can they always inhibit it. Moreover, sub-cortical mechanisms, such as the hypo-
thalamus, cannot decode semantic, cortical information. These constraints present the-
oretical challenges in specifying the dynamic, temporally extended, two-way interac-
tions between mental mechanisms and other components of the SOCS. How ought 
information about or traces from mental processing be integrated and affect subcorti-
cal components of the SOCS to determine whether progression on the path towards 
sleep should be pursued or inhibited?  
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To answer this question, we need new information processing concepts, a charac-
terization of wakeful cognition, and a mental architecture. 
Mental taxonomy and architecture 
To understand SO and devise insomnia therapies from the design stance, it is help-
ful (a) to classify mental states and processes in terms of their influence on SOCS; and 
(b) to embed the SOCS in a broad information processing architecture. Asomnolent 
mentation has no systematic effect on SO latency; insomnolent mentation tends to in-
crease it; and somnolent mentation tends to decrease it. Counter-insomnolent menta-
tion is deliberate mentation that interferes with insomnolent mentation. For example, if 
problem solving were insomnolent and meditation were incompatible with problem 
solving, then meditation may be counter-insomnolent. Mentation that is both counter-
insomnolent and somnolent is said to be super-somnolent (Beaudoin, 2013). 
The SOCS detects and processes insomnolent and somnolent mentation features. A 
fundamental scientific challenge is to characterize this integrative decision process, 
which may be complex and vary within and between individuals. One could create an 
elaborate taxonomy of mentation features (e.g., pertaining to speed of processing, 
amount of verbalization, degree of meta-management, assessment, scheduling, plan-
ning, deciding and/or imagery, or attributes of the motivators currently underlying 
mentation), and investigate whether, to what extent and how these features are treated 
as somnolent or insomnolent by a parsimonious SOCS. Empirical research might pro-
vide surprising answers (e.g., that processes that might intuitively be expected to be 
insomnolent are actually asomnolent).    
Because the SOCS is embedded not only in a neural architecture, but also a mental 
one, a design-based research program should be explicitly informed by a broad archi-
tecture of the human mind, one that is designed to handle the evolutionary require-
ments of autonomous agency such as the one proposed by Beaudoin & Sloman (1993), 
Beaudoin (2014, 1993), and Sloman (2003), now known as the H-CogAff theory, or 
Donald (2001). H-CogAff posits motive generators, which create or activate content 
for consideration by management processes; attention filtering, to heuristically deter-
mine which motives may gain attention; management processes to assess and decide 
motivators; and meta-management processes. (The latter two are often lumped togeth-
er as ‘executive processes’).  
H-CogAff distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary emotions. Primary 
emotions involve low level alarm systems and action tendencies. Motivators vary in 
insistence (tendency to disrupt attention), intensity (propensity to drive behavior), im-
portance (value), urgency (importance as a function of time) and other dimensions 
(Beaudoin, 1994). In perturbance (a form of tertiary emotions), insistent motivators 
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tend to disrupt management processing despite possible meta-management efforts 
(Sloman, 1987). 
Simon (1967) was the first to draw attention to the importance of interrupts at the 
emotion-laden intersection of cognition and affect. Wright, Sloman & Beaudoin 
(1995) characterize grief as perturbance. Dorothy Tennov wrote and Helen Fisher re-
search echoes that “Limerence is first and foremost a condition of cognitive obses-
sion”. The same is true of all tertiary emotions. They present a challenge to self-
regulation. See Wells & Matthews (1994) for further substantiation and clinical impli-
cations of loss of control of attention in emotions. 
Candidate insomnolent and somnolent features 
The SOCS must heuristically integrate reliable, valid and easily detectable menta-
tion features in its decisions to begin, further, suspend or reverse the progression to-
wards sleep. The following two considerations lead to Hypothesis 1. 
First, wakefulness (and hence consciousness) typically involves sense making and 
awareness of temporally extended situations, including perceptual and cognitive inte-
gration, pattern detection, and prediction—even in the case of mind wandering 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Second, mentation in the SO window is unique in the circadian cycle. SO is ac-
companied by loss of control of mental processes, loss of awareness of the environ-
ment, and (often) micro-dreams (Yang et al., 2010; Stenstrom, Fox, Solomonova, & 
Nielsen, 2012). More abstractly, varied self-generated imagery, varied memory access 
and reduced coherence are typical of SO. According to the SO emulation hypothesis, 
deliberate mentation strategies designed to mimic important features of SO mentation 
may shed light on somnolence, insomnolence and counter-insomnolence. The question 
arises, which of these SO features are not merely contributions to SO mentation, but 
causally important, inputs to the SOCS?  
Hypothesis 1. Temporally incoherent mentation is somnolent. An extended period 
of time during which management processes are active but not integrating situational 
information, i.e., are not involved in temporally extended sense making, may be both 
an effect of the SOCS initiating sleep and also interpreted by the SOCS as a signal that 
it can continue the gradual progression into sleep. 
Hypothesis 2. Active perturbance (tertiary emotion) is insomnolent. When man-
agement processes are captivated by insistent motivators, the SOCS tends to inhibit 
the progression towards sleep. 
Hypothesis 3. Primary emotions are also insomnolent. The generation or activation 
of alarm signals and other primary emotion states inhibit the progression towards 
sleep. 
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These hypotheses demand detailed designed-based specification and empirical in-
vestigation. 
Super-somnolent strategies: The cognitive shuffle and 
serial diverse imagining 
Several cognitive treatments for insomnia prescribe thinking strategies to utilize while 
trying to fall asleep. Most prior deliberate mentation strategies have three limitations: 
First, they are merely thought to be counter-insomnolent, meaning that they are de-
signed to interfere with insomnolent mentation; they are not inherently somnolent. 
Secondly, they are not particularly counter-insomnolent because the tasks are not suf-
ficiently engaging. For example, with classical imagery distraction (Morin & Azrin, 
1988), participants are given a collection of targets to vividly imagine, each for a sub-
stantial period of time, as they are trying to fall asleep. While this does promote SO, 
such a boring task cannot be expected to compete with intense primary emotions or in-
sistent motivators (perturbance), meaning it is not highly counter-insomnolent. More-
over, there is no reason to suspect that such processing would be interpreted by the 
SOCS as a SO signal. Meditation may be counter-insomnolent; but  it requires training 
and considerable executive effort for this task to compete with insistent motives; 
moreover successful meditation is said to be a state of alertness. Thirdly, they have not 
been developed from the design stance. 
Topic-based cognitive refocusing, TB-CRT-I (Gellis, Arigo & Elliott, 2013), is 
perhaps more engaging, and hence presumably more counter-insomnolent, than im-
agery distraction and traditional meditation. In TB-CRT-I users are trained to think 
about a topic of interest to them at SO. However, this type of refocusing cannot be ex-
pected to be inherently somnolent because it hardly differs from wakeful cognition 
(e.g., planning and imaging pleasant activities.)    
It seems therapeutically promising and theoretically germane to design and test de-
liberate mentation strategies that are both highly counter-insomnolent,  and somnolent, 
i.e., super-somnolent. The tasks must be engaging without being insomnolent. The 
cognitive shuffle is a deliberate mentation strategy in which one briefly thinks about a 
neutral or pleasant target and frequently switches to unrelated targets (normally every 
5-15 seconds). This could involve one or more of several types of mental processes. 
Serial diverse imagining (SDI) is a form of cognitive shuffle in which one briefly ima-
gines various unrelated targets, such as persons, places, things, actions and/or scenes. 
For example, one might imagine Pluto, eyeliner, a birthday party, a shed, playing golf, 
and so on. One is instructed not to attempt to relate one target with another. One 
wouldn’t, for instance, imagine placing eyeliner around Pluto at a birthday party. (This 
is different from typical, ineffective, thought suppression instructions.) 
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SDI implements Hypothesis 1 (above) in that it involves the suspension of situation 
awareness and temporal sense making. Sense may be made about each individual tar-
get, but the overall stream of mentation across targets is disintegrated. It elicits varied 
memories and images, two features associated with SO micro-dreams. This type of 
mentation is distinct, and uncharacteristic of waking cognition outside SO. 
According to Hypothesis 2, SDI is counter-insomnolent. It is an engaging task 
which may increase attention filter thresholds, making it more difficult for insistent 
motivators (concerns, worries, etc.) to distract attention. The subject is less likely to 
experience an active (hence insomnolent) perturbance. SDI may also provide protec-
tion against lingering effects of primary emotions. 
Note that because the cognitive shuffle is not experienced outside of SO, and the 
cognitive shuffle induces mentation in some respects akin to SO mentation, it should 
also be distinctly potent from a conditioning perspective. 
Because the waking human mind naturally tends to sense-making, to elicit diverse 
‘random’ content to imagine is not easy. The task requires a specially designed strate-
gy, for memory is highly associative. Beaudoin (2013) presented a self-directed (tech-
nology-free) lexical strategy that exploits phonetic cuing. It involves selecting a word, 
spelling it, and for each letter, serially imagining several other items that start with that 
letter. It is easy to explain this technique to insomnia clients. Alternatively, technology  
may be used. mySleepButton™ is a simple app developed  by CogSci Apps Corp. to 
apply the SDI technique. It provides an audio stream of sundry common, mundane, 
mostly concrete items to imagine. Whereas empirical evidence for SDI has not been 
published in academia, experiments using mySleepButton are being planned in collab-
oration with sleep researchers at SFU and other universities. 
Conclusion 
Insomnia research and design-based cognitive science have developed in parallel 
with virtually no interaction. Insomnia research does not seem to have drawn from AI 
in general, or design-based models of cognition and affect in particular, though it has 
been informed by traditional, empirical psychology of emotion (Baglionia, Spiegel-
haldera, Lombardob & Riemann, 2010; Schmidt, Harvey & VanderLinden, 2011). 
Yet, the most important insomnolent feature of insomnia is also the most salient fea-
ture of emotion, namely perturbance, which lies at the intersection of cognition, emo-
tion and motive processing (Sloman, 1987; Wright, Sloman & Beaudoin, 1996).  
 Meanwhile, information processing  models of cognition, emotion, and motivation 
have not explicitly characterized SO information processing. Perhaps this is because 
SO seems so simple — the SOCS is viewed as part of a “switch”, the SSSS.  We 
should recall, however, that few anticipated the difficulty of explaining how vision 
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might work until researchers tried to replicate vision in software (Lamontagne, 1976). 
What looks simple is sometimes quite complex. 
This paper has provided new concepts that researchers, therapists and insomnia suf-
ferers can use to think and communicate about SO and insomnia. The theory devel-
oped here is still at an early stage. This paper draws attention to the need (a) to devel-
op  broad, design-based explanations of how cortical, mental phenomena influence 
SO; and (b) to explore insomnia treatments based on these explanations. 
Keywords: super-somnolent mentation, the cognitive shuffle, serial diverse imag-
ining, insomnia, sleep onset, CBT-I. 
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